Security analysis of two lightweight certificateless signature schemes

Security analysis of two lightweight certificateless signature schemes
درجه علمی نشریه: 
دوره: 
۵
شماره: 
۲
شماره صفحه (از - تا): 
۱-۷
چکیده

Certificateless cryptography can be considered as an intermediate solution to overcome the issues in traditional public key infrastructure (PKI) and identity-based public key cryptography (ID-PKC).‎ There exist a vast number of certificateless signature (CLS) schemes in the literature;‎ however, most of them are not efficient enough to be utilized in limited resources environments such as Internet of things (IoT) or Healthcare Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN).‎ Recently, two lightweight CLS schemes have been proposed by Karati et al.‎ and Kumar et al.‎ to be employed in IoT and HWSNs, respectively.‎ While both schemes are claimed to be existentially unforgeable, in this paper, we show that both these signatures can easily be forged.‎ More specifically, it is shown that 1) in Karati et al.‎'s scheme, a type 1 adversary, considered in certificateless cryptography, can generate a valid partial private key corresponding to any user of its choice and as a consequence, it can forge any users' signature on any message of its choice, and 2) in Kumar et al.‎'s scheme, both types of adversaries which are considered in certificateless cryptography are able to forge any signer's signature on an arbitrary message.‎

استناد: 

Pakniat, Nasrollah.‎ 2019.‎ Security analysis of two lightweight certificateless signature schemes.‎ Journal of Computing and Security. ۵ (۲): ۱-۷.

مقاله ادواری علمی
وضعیت انتشار: 

افزودن دیدگاه